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Shield

brew install --cask shield v1.2

App to protect against process injection

12
30-day installs · #3797
29
90-day · #4239
124
365-day · #4082

Links

Raw metadata
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      "target": "/Applications/Shield.app"
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          "trash": "/Library/Application Support/Shield/com.csaba.fitzl.shield.preferences.plist"
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  "deprecated": 0,
  "deprecation_reason": null,
  "desc": "App to protect against process injection",
  "disable_reason": null,
  "disabled": 0,
  "display_name": "Shield",
  "enrichment_fetched_at": "2026-06-20T22:49:24+00:00",
  "first_seen": "2026-06-20T00:47:34+00:00",
  "full_token": "shield",
  "github_default_branch": null,
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  "github_stars": null,
  "github_topics": [],
  "homepage": "https://theevilbit.github.io/shield/",
  "homepage_og_description": "Shield - An app to protect against process injection on macOS Link to heading In this post I would like to tell the story of the Shield.app development and also introduce its features. It\u2019s been a ride over the past year, and I wasn\u2019t sure always that it will happen.\nMotivation for limiting process injections Link to heading In the past 2 years I started to dig into macOS security research, and along the way it became pretty clear that beyond memory corruption issues the alpha and omega of macOS exploits is to run code in the context of other applications. The reason for this lies within the security model of macOS (and in fact *OS as well). Each application has a list of entitlements that grants the application various rights. If we take only 3rd party applications it\u2019s mostly around what it can do if it\u2019s sandboxed (e.g.: access the network) or if not sandboxed, which privacy (TCC) protected areas can it access, like camera, microphone, messages, etc\u2026 In case of TCC, if we don\u2019t hold these entitlements, we can\u2019t access those resources or location even if we run as root.",
  "homepage_og_image": null,
  "homepage_title": "Shield - An app to protect against process injection on macOS \u00b7 theevilbit blog",
  "installs_30d": 12,
  "installs_365d": 124,
  "installs_90d": 29,
  "last_seen": "2026-06-20T00:47:34+00:00",
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  "names": [
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  "rank_30d": 3797,
  "rank_365d": 4082,
  "rank_90d": 4239,
  "raw_hash": "b642b490cc515bfc",
  "ruby_source_path": "Casks/s/shield.rb",
  "tap": "homebrew/cask",
  "token": "shield",
  "version": "1.2",
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